An impaired debt claim is similar to an equity o wnership position or a 'creditor toehold' in the distressed rm. When the rm goes bankrupt and is sold in an open, ascending auction with two bidders, the toehold induces the creditor to nance the lowest-valuation bidder and to push for overbidding. Examining mandatory bankruptcy auctions in Sweden, we nd strong toehold e ects: The greater the toehold the lower the probability that the old bank nances the winning bidder, and the higher the winning going-concern premium, both as predicted. Controlling for toehold e ects, there is no evidence that the going-concern premium is lower in business cycle downturns, in relatively distressed industries, or when sold to industry outsiders. Thus, there is no support for asset re-sale arguments, possibly because bidding with creditor toehold helps counteract re-sale tendencies in relatively illiquid auctions.
Introduction
In Sweden, insolvent rms that fail to restructure their debt claims out-of-court are automatically sold in a court-supervised, cash-only bankruptcy auction. The auction results in either a piecemeal liquidation or the sale of the company's business as a going concern. The e ciency of such a mandatory auction system, relative to one including a renegotiation option such as Chapter 11 in the U.S. bankruptcy law, is an important but unresolved issue. On the one hand, it is possible that liquidity problems and lack of competition promote asset re-sales (e.g., Aghion, Hart, and Moore (1992) and Shleifer and Vishny (1992) ). On the other hand, there may bea substantial risk that court-supervised debt renegotiations promote its own ine ciencies by biasing resource allocations towards poormanagement (e.g., Jensen (1991) , Bradley and Rosenzweig (1992) ). We address this controversy by examining the incentive of the main creditor of the bankrupt rm to nance a bidder in the bankruptcy auction in order to maximize debt recovery, and whether this incentive empirically counteracts the tendency for asset re-sales in potentially illiquid auctions.
While empirical evidence on auction bankruptcy is sparse, recent wo r k b a s e d o n S w edish data suggests that auctions are surprisingly e ective. Thorburn (2000) shows that auctions result in relatively low direct costs and produces debt recovery rates and going-concern survival rates that are no lower than what has been reported for Chapter 11 cases. 1 Also, Thorburn (1999) nds that, although auction bankruptcy signi cantly lowers CEO compensation and increases turnover, there is no evidence that managers delay bankruptcy lings (which w ould have resulted in destruction of going-concern value). Str omberg (2000) reports estimates of liquidation values that are somewhat lower when the bankrupt assets are sold to industry outsiders, as predicted by asset re-sale arguments. However, he also reports that sale-backs of bankrupt rms to their old owners increase in periods of industry distress, and conjectures that sale-backs thus help avoid asset re-sales. 2 The theoretical analysis in Str omberg (2000) captures the notion that a creditor's impaired debt claim is analogous to an equity position{or, in our vernacular, a "creditor toehold"{in the auctioned rm. The toehold impacts the creditor's nancing decision. Speci cally, in his model, the bankrupt rm is either "liquidated" in an auction or "sold back" to its previous owners at a premium in these contests are impacted by creditor toeholds. Interestingly, since creditor toeholds are exogenously determined and observable at the outset of the auction, this analysis can be carried out using simple regression techniques mapping the toehold size onto the winning bid premium, as suggested by t h e o r i e s o f o verbidding. 6 We measure the winning bid premium as ln(p=v l ), where p is the winning bid value and v l is given by the trustee's initial estimate of the value of the auctioned assets if liquidated piecemeally. 7 The role of the going-concern auction is to establish the price above and beyond the piecemeal liquidation value of the rm. We think of v l as capturing the common value component, while bidders use their individual private going-concern valuations to compete in the auction. To avoid econometric issues of endogeneity, w e measure, for most purposes, creditor toeholds using only the common value component v l that is observable at the beginning of the auction.
Our new data also allows us to classify the bankrupt rm's old bank nancing decision. Interestingly, our multinomial probability estimation shows that the greater the expected toehold, the greater the piecemeal liquidation probability a n d the lower the probability that the old bank nances the winning bid. At rst, this appears to support the key nding of Str omberg (2000) that the probability of a sale-back increases in the sale-back bias (i.e., when the risk-free sale-back option tends to pay o a large portion of the outstanding senior and bank debt). However, our result does not support the Str ombergsale-back bias interpretation becausethe creditor toehold pushes the bank to nance the winning bid also when the buyer is a new owner (i.e., when it is not a sale-back) as well as when there are competing bids in the auction (i.e., when the sale-back option is not risk-free).
Thus, our nding changes the interpretation of Str omberg's own empirical result and o ers an alternative and broader explanation for the observed impact of the creditor toehold: The greater the old bank's toehold, the greater the bank's incentive to nance relatively low-valuation bidders and push for overbidding. The low v aluation lowers the probability that the winning bid is actually nanced by the old bank. Since overbidding should result in higher winning going-concern premiums, this explanation further requires that the going-concern premium is increasing in the bank's toehold at the beginning of the auction. This is precisely what our premium regressions show: The winning going-concern premium is strongly increasing in the bank's creditor toehold size. We also nd that bank nancing of the winning bid has a positive impact on the winning bid premium beyond the toehold e ect. These results reject the notion that bank involvement in the auction is detrimental to the interest of other junior creditors.
Finally, c o n trolling for toehold e ects, we address the re-sale hypothesis of Shleifer and Vishny (1992) . This hypothesis maintains that rms tend to le for bankruptcy at a time when there is widespread illiquidity in the rm's industry. As a result, the rm risks being sold to industry outsiders that may be less e cient in managing the rm's assets and thus may place relatively low bids in the auction. Thus, we examine whether the going-concern premium depends on buyer identity, industry liquidity and aggregate demand conditions represented by the business cycle. As argued by Maksimovic and Phillips (1998) , while bankruptcies may be caused by ine cient management, they may also be a result of low product demand (which a ect e cient rms as well). Thus, the probability o f ine cient bankruptcy outcomes (such as asset re-sales) should be greater in periodsof depression. Our sample period includes two distinct business cycle regimes in Sweden{a boomfollowed by a major recession. Overall, we nd little support for the re-sale argument. Since our model suggests that banks have a greater incentive t o " m a k e the market" for the auctioned rm the more severely distressed their debt claim, a consistent explanation for this evidence is that bidding with creditor toehold e ectively counteracts a tendency for asset-re sales.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses theoretical bidding arguments using either equity or creditor toeholds. Section 3 provides a description of the Swedish auction bankruptcy system and of our extensions to the original Str omberg-Thorburn data set. Section 4 presents test of empirical hypotheses related to the bank's bidding and re nancing behavior, as well as the asset re-sale hypothesis. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Toeholds and overbidding: Theory
In this section, we examine the bank's incentive to re nance a buyer in the bankruptcy auction and the optimal bidding strategy for such a buyer. We start by recapturing the main intuition behind the overbidding result developed by Burkart (1995) and Singh (1998) . While their results concern bidding with equity toeholds, they are developed in the context of open, ascending auctions which resemble actual bankruptcy auctions. Similar to the discussion in Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1999) , we then extend the overbidding results to the case of bidding with creditor toehold. Since the bankrupt rm is auctioned by a trustee, the free-rider problems identi ed by Grossman and Hart (1980) is non-existent. Thus, the auction is for the entire rm and it will be sold to the highest bidder. Moreover, since we are ultimately focusing on creditor toeholds, we assume there is at most one bidder with such a toehold.
To the extent that toeholds have strategic value in the auction, equity toehold strategies are inherently dynamic, starting with the decision to acquire a toehold in the market prior to the auction itself. Thus, a complete empirical analysis of equity toeholds in takeover contests must deal with the endogenous nature of the toehold. A similar empirical concern arises in bankruptcy auctions when there is a liquid market for distressed debt claims. For example, vulture funds in the U.S. acquire distressed debt precisely for the purpose of a ecting the outcome of the Chapter 11 bargaining process. However, in the context of bankruptcies in Sweden, where debt markets are illiquid and bank-debt dominates, strategic debt purchases are unlikely. 8 Thus, the level of the creditor toehold can betreated as exogenous at the start of the auction, as required by the theoretical results on overbidding.
Bidding with equity toehold
Suppose there are two bidders, 1 and 2, where bidder 1 owns a toehold equal to a fraction of the target equity. Thus, while bidder 2 must bid for all target shares, bidder 1 only needs to acquire 1 ; portion of the shares. The target rm is assumed to be worth v l + v 1 to bidder 1, and v l + v 2 to bidder 2, where v l is a common value component a n d v 1 and v 2 are private valuations distributed independently and identically over some interval v v].
The private valuations v 1 and v 2 are typically thought of as unique synergy e ects, emanating from the respective bidders' specialized resources. In the context of our bankruptcy auctions, however, we treat v l as the piecemeal liquidation value and, by implication, the private value components as the going-concern premium. Thus, we view the auction as establishing the price to be paid for the right to generate the respective bidder's private going-concern value.
Since we do not believe that the common piecemeal liquidation value materially a ects the bidding strategies, we assume the players' private information is only on the private valuation components. Consistent with this assumption, we compute v l using the piecemeal liquidation value estimate of the bankruptcy trustee in our empirical analysis. In the following, we subtract v l from the bid values, so that rescaled bids are from the interval p 2 0 v]:
The auction goes as follows. The outsider opens the auctions with a bid of p 2 = 0 , and bidder 1 has the option to match or to pass. By convention, if bidder 1 matches, bidder 2 must increase the bid, or bidder 1 wins. With zero bidding costs, it is a dominant strategy in this auction setting for bidder 2 to bid incrementally up to her valuation v 2 . Moreover, in the absence of a toehold, the auction outcome is what Hirshleifer (1995) labels the "ratchet solution": The bidder with the highest valuation wins at a price equal to the valuation of the second highest bidder.
However, the ratchet solution does not follow when one of the bidders has an equity toehold. The intuition is simple. Suppose that bidder 1 owns a toehold of in the target, and that bidder 2 is the highest-valuation bidder (v 2 > v 1 ). The ratchet solution would be that bidder 2 wins and pays v 1 for the target shares. However, since bidder 1 has a stake in the target, she has an interest in driving up the winning bid (conditional on losing the auction). Since the winning bidder pays the last o er of the losing bidder, bidder 1 raises the winning bid by bidding above v 1 (overbidding).
The optimal amount of overbidding depends on the expected gain on the toehold conditional on losing the auction to bidder 2, and the expected loss from winning the bid at a (second) price exceeding v 1 . Burkart (1995) 
Rearranging, the optimal bid equals
In sum, the bidder with an equity toehold bids aggressively beyond her own valuation. 9 We now turn to the analogous argument in the case where one bidder bids in a coalition with a bank that owns a creditor toehold in the target.
Bidding with creditor toehold
Suppose bank b owns a debt claim in the target (bankrupt) rm. The bank's debt has a face value of f b dollars, and the sale of the rm in the auction results in a recovery rate of r 2 0 1] of this face value. Recovery rates of either zero or one implies that the value of the bank's debt claim is e ectively independent of the winning bid. This is indicated by the shaded area in Figure 1 . For the remaining cases (0 < r < 1) the bank's claim is distressed while creditors senior to the bank, representing debt claims with a face value of f s dollars, are paid in full. When 0 < r < 1, the bank recovers an additional dollar for every dollar increase in the winning bid.
Suppose the bank's claim represents only a portion < 1 of the total claim of a creditor class of equal priority debt. Then, when the recovery rate is 0 < r < 1 for the class as a whole, the bank recovers only for every dollar increase in the winning bid. 10 However, in our sample of 9 See Burkart (1995) for proof that the bid in equation (3) represents an equilibrium strategy. 10 This case is modeled in Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1999) .
Swedish rms, the bank is always in a creditor class by itself. Thus, over the interval 0 < r < 1, the partial derivative o f the bank's recovery with respect to the winning bid value is always equal to one. Consequently, the bank's e ective toehold in the bankrupt rm in this interval is t 1 ; r and zero otherwise. In Figure 1 , t equals zero in the shaded areas, i.e., when the winning bid is less than or equal to the face value f s of creditors senior to the bank, or when the winning bid exceeds f b + f s .
In order to analyze the incentive e ect of the bank's creditor toehold, assume that t > 0. Bank b can choose to either remain passive in the auction or to take an active role by nancing one of the two bidders, 1 and 2. We assume that bidder 1 is the old owner of the target, while bidder 2 is an "outsider". Thus, if bidder 1 wins, the auction results in a sale-back to the old owner (with or without bank b nancing). When bank b remains passive, neither bidder has a toehold, and the auction produces the ratchet solution. In this case, the payo to bank b equals
Since bank b, when passive, receives the payo implied by the ratchet solution, the objective o f b's nancing decision is to improve o n t h i s p a yo , i.e., by forcing the winning bidder to pay a price higher than min v 1 v 2 ]. As shown below, and illustrated in Figure 2 , this is precisely the e ect of overbidding with a creditor toehold. Since the creditor toehold goes with the bank, whichever bidder bank b decides to nance has the toehold.
We assume that b knows v 1 due to its creditor relationship with the old owner. Moreover, ex ante, b knows only the distribution over v 2 , while she learns v 2 following a decision to nance bidder 2. 11 Thus, the bank's nancing decision is based on a comparison of v 1 with E(v 2 ). Since the objective is to raise the winning bid above the ratchet solution, the bank's strategy is to nance the bidder with the ex ante lowest valuation and get this bidder to overbid. 12 Thus, the bank nances bidder 1 if v 1 E(v 2 ), and it nances bidder 2 otherwise. Also, in this model, as long as the bank's creditor toehold is positive, it will always nance a buyer. We assume that a bidder in coalition with the bank b agrees to a bidding strategy that maximizes the total payo for the coalition. Comparing this expression with the expected payo in the case of equity toehold (equation (1) above), the di erence arises because t > 0 implies = 1 and because senior creditors are paid f s regardless of who wins. 
Thus, in an auction where the old bank nances the old owner, the coalition optimally overbids.
Also, comparing the optimal prices in Eq. (3) and Eq. (8), since (for < 1)
the overbidding is greater with a creditor toehold than with an equity toehold. The intuition is that the only cost of overbidding with a creditor toehold is the reduction in the probability of losing the auction, while in the case of an equity toehold there is an additional cost of overpaying when the bidder wins the contest. As shown in Figure 2 , Case 1 may lead to an ine cient auction outcome. This is the case whenever overbidding results in bidder 1 winning and v 1 < v 2 . I.e., the lowest-valuation bidder wins the auction. This is analogous to the potential for ine ciency emphasized by Burkart (1995) in the context of takeover bidding with equity toeholds.
Case 2: Old bank nances new owner
Case 2 is illustrated by the lower branch in Figure 2 . In this case, t > 0 and v 1 > E (v 2 ), and the bank decides to nance the outside bidder 2. By assumption, b learns v 2 and thus knows both v 1 and v 2 . Bidder 1, who now bids without a toehold, continues to know only the distribution over v 2 .
Sine the decision to nance bidder 2 is based on E(v 2 ) rather than on the actual value of v 2 , there are two possible outcomes. If the bank learns that v 2 < v 1 , the optimal bid is simply p 2 = v 1 ; , where is an arbitrarily small, positive n umber. This bid ensures that bidder 1 wins the auction and pays p 2 , thus maximizing the bank's recovery. Alternatively, if the bank learns that v 2 v 1 , the optimal bid is p 2 v 1 . In either case, the highest-valuation bidder wins the auction, and there is no potential for an ine cient allocation of the bankrupt rm's assets.
The equityholder's agreement to overbid
As noted earlier, the above discussion assumes that a bidder (equityholder) in coalition with the bank b agrees to a bidding strategy that maximizes the total payo for the coalition as a whole.
This agreement requires that overbidding does not make the equityholder worse o . There are two mechanisms by which this requirement may besatis ed. The rst is to make sure that the expected value of the bank's new debt claim on the bidder rm (issued in return for the bid nancing) decreases in the expected overbidding cost to the equityholder. In this case, the bank may be forced to bear the entire expected overbidding cost. Recall from Figure 2 that overbidding is costless in all outcomes where the coalition loses the contest. Moreover, winning with overbidding is also costless when the winning price does not exceed the valuation of the second-best bidder (i.e., when overbidding results in the ratchet solution). Thus, overbidding is costless (and bene cial) in all e cient outcomes pictured in Figure 2 .
However, overbidding is costly for the equityholder in the ine cient outcome in Figure 2 , where the coalition wins paying a price exceeding its own valuation v 1 . In order to induce the equityholder's agreement to overbid risking this outcome, the bank must be issued (and does in fact agree to receive) a debt claim whose expected value decreases dollar for dollar in the equityholder's 
That is, the payo from winning equals the private valuation of the bankrupt rm minus the value of the bank's claim and the equity infusion to nance the bid.
Continuing this case, de ne = v 2 ; v 1 as the opportunity cost for the coalition of winning the auction paying v 2 when the coalition's private valuation is v 1 . For e W to be non-negative, it must be that
This equation shows that the bank's debt claim must be reduced by the value of the equityholder's overpayment cost in the event that the auction results in the ine cient outcome. The probability o f this event occuring equals the probability t h a t v 1 < v 2 < p 1 . In the case of the uniform distribution, 
Alternatively, the bidding incentives of the equityholder and the bank are aligned if the coalition's equityholder has previously issued a personal guarantee of full repayment of the bank's claim on the bankrupt rm (a frequent occurrence in small-rm nancing in Sweden). In this case, the equityholder is in a similar position as the bank itself. That is, the equityholder shares in the bene tof overbidding, and is thus willing to bearthe corresponding expected cost. The bene t to the equityholder is that the greater bank recovery from the greater winning price reduces the equityholder's liability vis-a-vis the old bank.
In this case, which is illustrated in Figure 3 , the equityholder's creditor toehold is equal to that of the bank. We n o w turn to the empirical investigation of actual nancing-and bidding behavior in bankruptcy auctions.
3 Swedish auction bankruptcy: Structure and data 3.1 Auction structure Figure 4 illustrates key potential outcomes in a Swedish rm's process towards being sold in a bankruptcy auction, starting with the point of insolvency. The insolvent rm (i.e., a rm where the face value of debt claims exceeds the market value of the assets) may rst consider attempting to use the composition option (event 1 ) p r o vided by S w edish insolvency law. This option allows the rm to renegotiate the debt claim of junior (unsecured) creditors. However, successful composition is elusive as senior creditors are not part of the proposal and need not agree unless they are o ered full repayment. Since anything less than full repayment implies a wealth transfer from senior to junior creditors, composition is almost never attempted. Indeed, Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) report 300 bankruptcy lings but only four successful composition attempts in the population of 1,650 nancially distressed Swedish rms with at least 20 employees during 1990-92. Failing composition, the rm may explore the potential for negotiating an out-of-court sale of the rm's assets as a going concern (event 2 ) . This negotiation is typically initiated by the ownermanager and is subject to approval by secured creditors, which include the rm's main bank. Following this sale, the rm is still insolvent (the cash proceeds from the sale are necessarily less than the face value of outstanding debt) and must thus le for bankruptcy (event 3). This ling represents a prepackaged b ankruptcy solution ("auction prepack") since the assets have already been sold. 13 The role of the bankruptcy court in this instance is primarily to allow junior creditors to object to the sale and, if the sale is disproved, to organize an open auction. Empirically, auction prepack lings are almost never overturned.
Thorburn (2000) shows that auction prepacks have signi cantly lower direct costs than a regular bankruptcy ling. Thus, it is natural to assume that a regular auction bankruptcy ling (event 4) signals a failed prepack attempt. 14 Thorburn (2000) examines whether this signal manifests itself in di erent r e c o very rates across prepacks and regular going-concern sales. She reports that prepacks have lower direct bankruptcy costs. However, she fails to nd any other substantive di erence in the auction outcomes.
When ling for regular auction bankruptcy, the incumbent management team is replaced by an independent, court-appointed, professional trustee who has a formal duciary duty towards creditors. Trustees are certi ed by a government supervisory authority ("Tillsynsmyndigheten i Konkurs" or TSM), who reviews the trustees' compensation and performance. Poorly performing trustees (e.g., in terms of their e orts to maintain the bankruptcy auction) risk losing their license. Trustees are also subject to the wrath of major creditors should they appear not to maintain a proper auction procedure. Thus, collusion between owner-managers and the trustee, e.g., in a saleback t o t h e o l d o wners, places the individual trustee's reputation at risk. Trustees are compensated on an hourly basis.
The trustee organizes the sale of the rm in an open, ascending (English) auction, either as a going concern (event 5) or piecemeal liquidation (event 6). A going concern sale takes place by merging the assets and operations of the rm into a receiving company set up or held by the buyer, akin to a leverage buyout transaction. 15 The method of payment is restricted to cash only, and creditors are paid strictly according to the absolute priority of their claims.
While in bankruptcy, and before the asset sale, the rm is protected by an automatic stay of creditors (i.e., debt service is halted and creditors cannot seize collateral.) Furthermore, debtorin-possession nancing is permitted. 16 As a result, the rm can maintain its operations while in bankruptcy and raise new capital through debt issues with super-priority status. In practice, bankrupt rms tend to cover operating expenses by increasing their debt obligations in the form of trade credits (which get super-priority), while new debt issues or bank loans are almost never observed. 17 In Figure 4 , the going-concern-sale event contains four separate sub-categories, classi ed as to who buys the rm (old versus new owner) and who nances the buyer (old versus new bank). With this classi cation, we address issues concerning the bank's incentive to nance the buyer, and whether the winning bid in the auction re ects the incentives to overbid, as discussed above. These issues are discussed below.
Data sources and characteristics
The starting point for our sample of Swedish bankruptcies is the original Str omberg and Thorburn (1996) data base also underlying Thorburn (2000) , Thorburn (1999) and Str omberg (2000) . This data set includes a total of 263 bankruptcies from 01/88{12/91, selected from a population of 1,159 bankrupt rms having at least 20 employees. The source of the population is Upplysnings-Centralen AB (UC), and the Str omberg-Thorburn sample is restricted to bankruptcies in the four largest administrative p r o vinces in Sweden, including the country's three main metropolitan areas, Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malm o. The sample rms are among the largest in Sweden: only 6% of Swedish corporations have 20 employees or more. All rms are privately held, and most have concentrated ownership. 18 Str omberg-Thorburn collect case-speci c information from the o cial bankruptcy les kept by TSM. However, these les do not contain su cient information on key characteristics for this paper, such a s t h e n umber of bidders, the duration (numberofdays) of the auction, and the nancing of the winning bid (old bank versus new bank). As a result, we requested detailed information from each individual trustee across the 263 bankruptcies. To d a t e , we have received responses covering 113 individual auctions. As shown in Figure 5 , in a substantial numberof cases, the numberof potential buyers expressing an interest in submitting a bid exceeds 1. As listed in Table 1 , the average numberof interested bidders equals 5.5 with a median of 3. Moreover, as illustrated in Figure 6 , the substantial expression of interest translates into multiple bids (more than one) in a majority of the auctions. The average number of actual bids equal 3.6 with a median of 2.0. The duration of the bidding averages 27 days.
When asked to characterize the nature of the auction process itself, the typical response of the trustees is that the rms are sold in an open, ascending auction. Interestingly, the trustees view also the typical sale-back as resulting from an open auction procedure, i.e., in competition with other actual or potential bids. This is important as it con rms our assumption that the bankruptcy auction process encompasses sale-backs as well as sales to new owners. The view of the trustees is also directly supported by the frequency distribution for the number of bids shown in Figure 6 .
Furthermore, our empirical analysis requires information on the old bank's decision tonance the bidder in going-concern auctions. This information is drawn in part from Thorburn (2000) and from the trustees' responses. The information includes whether the buyer beingnanced represents the old owner/manager or new investors. Thorburn (2000) collects this information from the national register of corporate oating charge claims ("Inskrivningsmyndigheten f or f oretagsinteckning"). Of the 200 going concern sales listed in Table 1 , the bank nancing of the 18 The sample rms are small in absolute terms. The book value of total assets one year prior to ling averages $2.5 million, and the number of employees averages 43.
winning bid is identi ed for 117 cases. Also, we incorporate information on the equity ownership of incumbent CEOs compiled by Thorburn (2000) .
Our measures of industry distress exploits the complete nancial statements of the population of more than 15,000 Swedish rms with at least 20 employees. The industry distress factor is a continuous variable measuring the fraction of rms in the industry that either reports an interest coverage ratio less than one or les for bankruptcy in the same calendar year. The industry is de ned on either a 2-digit or a 4-digit level. 19 The source of this information is UC. The industry information is also used to estimate the relative accounting (operating) performance of bankrupt rms. Finally, w e extend the Str omberg-Thorburn data base with information on the business cycle. We construct a monthly, composit business cycle index from a set of factors that includes consumer and producer price indices, gross national product, and in ation. The source of this information is Statistics Sweden.
The sample rms represent more than 30 di erent 2-digit SIC groups, with 29% in manufacturing industries, 24% in construction and wholesale industries, 10% in the hotel and restaurant industry, 10% in the transportation industry, and the balance of 27% scattered across a numberof other industries. Table 1 shows the number of cases across the outcomes depicted in Figure 4 . Of the 263 bankrupt rms in the sample, 53 (20%) succeeded in performing a prepack while the remaining 80% submitted a regular auction bankruptcy ling. Of 207 regular lings, 60 (29%) are liquidated piecemeal and 147 (71%) are sold as a going concern. 20 4 Empirical analysis 4.1 Auction premiums and average recovery rates Table 2 lists the average and median values of the auction premium and total recovery rates classi ed by bankruptcy outcome (going-concern sales, prepacks, and piecemeal liquidations) and the identity of the buyer (old or new owner). We de ne the auction premium c as the winning bid price p in percent of the trustee's liquidation value estimate of the assets sold in the auction, v a l , i.e., c p=v a l ; 1. With few exceptions, the auction excludes accounts receivables and other nancial claims, thusv a l <v l . Table 2 does not list the value of c for auction prepacks since the trustee's liquidation value estimate is made when the prepack sales price is known.
The average value of c ranges from a low of 8% for piecemeal liquidations to a high of 131%
for going-concern sales to old owners (sale-backs). Note that the 8% premium (median 2%) for piecemeal liquidations supports our contention that the trustee's liquidation estimate is just that a good estimate of the winning bid value in a piecemeal liquidation auction. Notice also that the high premium in sale-backs fails to support arguments suggesting that the bank somehow short-cuts the auction mechanism by nancing the old owner and acquires the rm at relatively low prices. Table 2 shows the bank's total recovery rate, r b (p ; f s )=f b , which ranges from a low of 46% in piecemeal liquidations to a high of 77% in auction prepacks. Thus, the bank recovers substantially more (and junior debt substantially less) than the average for the rm as a whole.
Finally, column 4 lists the bank's recovery rate at the liquidation value de ned as r bv (v l ;f s )=f b where f s and f b are the face values of the debt senior to the bank and of the bank, respectively. Note that r bv , which i s u s e d b e l o w to compute the bank's toehold value, represents a lower bound on the bank's recovery rate since it ignores the going-concern premium produced by the auction.
The average value of r bv ranges from a low of 45% in piecemeal liquidations to a high of 67% in sale-backs.
Outcome probabilities and expected toeholds
Let t n = 1 ; r n 2 0 1] denote the average creditor toehold in auction outcome n corresponding to the average recovery rate r n . Moreover, let n (x j ) denote the probability of auction outcome n conditional on some vector of rm-speci c characteristics x j . The conditional expected value of the toehold is computed as E(t j ) = P 3 n=1 n (x j ) t n .
21 See Thorburn (2000) for a cross-sectional analysis of the total recovery rates in our sample.
We rst estimate n (x j ) using the following multinomial logit model across the three main auction outcomes (piecemeal liquidation, auction prepack, going-concern sale):
where n is a (K = 7 1)-vector of parameters. 
where size is the natural logarithm of the bankrupt rm's total assets as indicated in the last nancial statement prior to ling promarg is the industry-adjusted pro t margin, de ned as preling gross margin (EBITDA divided by total sales) minus the contemporaneous median gross margin of all Swedish rms with at least 20 employees and the same 4-digit industry code as the sample rm secured is the proportion of the total debt that is secured float is the numberof oating charge debt holders bcy1991 is a binary variable with a value of one if the bankruptcy ling in 1991 and zero otherwise and distress is an industry distress variable measured as the fraction of Swedish rms with more than 20 employees sharing the same 2-digit SIC code industry that either reports an interest coverage ratio of less than one in the year of the bankruptcy ling or les for bankruptcy during that calendar year. The logit model cannot be estimated directly as the parameters n are determined only up to an additive constant (i.e., one can add a constant to each n without altering the estimated value of j n ). The solution is to x the set of parameters associated with one of the outcomes, and rescale the remaining parameters relative t o t h a t " n umeraire" outcome. Throughout the analysis, we select the piecemeal liquidation outcome as the numeraire outcome (n = 1). Let _ n denote the parameter value rescaled in this manner. Thus, _ 1 = 0 , and _ n = n ; 1 for n = 2 3: The multinomial logit model is then 
Panel I of table 4 shows the estimated coe cient v alues in the vector for each of the two outcomes auction prepack (n = 2) and going concern sale (n = 3). The values of the likelihood-ratio test statistics (LRT) indicate that the parameter estimates are jointly signi cant ( L R T=22.10 with 12 degrees of freedom). 23 Since the probabilities at each stage sum to one, the parameters n reported in Ta b l e 4 d o n o t represent partial derivatives of the probabilities with respect to each of the o er characteristics.
That is, a change in the kth o er characteristic changes all three probabilities simultaneously, so that the partial for one probability becomes
Panel IIin Table 4 shows the value of this partial derivative for all the probabilities and all the o er characteristics, along with the imputed t-statistics. The probability of piecemeal liquidations increase with the number of secured debtholders and with bankruptcy lings in the business cycle downturn in the year 1991. Auction prepacks are more likely the greater the bankrupt rm's asset size and the greater the proportion secured debt. The probability of an going concern sale is greater the greater the number of oating charge debtholders. Panel I of Table 5 reports the average probabilities resulting from the multinomial estimation, as well as the probability e v aluated at the mean values of the characteristics in x. Relative to the simple outcome frequency (as reported in Panel I), the multinomial analysis lowers the probability 22 Generally, the likelihood function is determined by de ning an index yjn which equals 1 if auction j results in outcome n, and zero otherwise. Then for a total of E outcomes and N bids, the likelihood function is which (with the logit function) has a unique maximum. 23 The likelihood ratio test (LRT) compares the performance of the model to a model with only constants. The test is distributed 2 with degrees of freedom equal to the number of additional explanatory power. of piecemeal liquidation increases the probability of going-concern sale.
Pa n e l I I a n d I I I o f T able 5 show the mean and median values of three alternative measures of the creditor toehold variable t = 1 ; r. Figure 7 , the bank's toehold equals zero (i.e., the bank receives full recovery at the trustee's estimate) in approximately 80 bankruptcy lings. Moreover, in another 20 cases, the bank's toehold equals one, indicating zero recovery at the estimated liquidation value. The intermediate cases are fairly evenly distributed across the entire range between 0 and 1. In contrast, as shown in Figures 8 and 9 , when weighting the recovery rates with the ex-ante probability estimates , the frequency distribution centers on toehold sizes of approximately 30% in the case of t 2 and approximately 36% in the case of t 3 , with very low frequencies for toeholds lower than 25% or higher than 40%.
The impact of the toehold on the bank's nancing decision
In this section, we use multinomial logit to estimate the probability that either the old bank or a new bank nances the winning bid in the auction as a function of the expected toehold (either t 2 or t 3 ). 24 Furthermore, the vector of explanatory variables include other factor that may be important to the bank's nancing decision, such as the degree of industry distress (distress), the rm's pre-ling industry-adjusted pro t margin (profmarg), as well as rm size (size). As before, we use piecemeal liquidation as the numeraire outcome. Table 6 reports results based on toehold t 2 , while Table 7 shows results using toehold t 3 . In either table, Panel I shows the coe cient estimates for each of the explanatory variables, while Panel II shows the partial derivatives with respect to the same vector of explanatory variables. The most striking result from bothtables is the strong impact of the toehold combined with an insigni cant impact of the other three regressors. The toehold e ect, regardless of de nition t 2 or t 3 , is to reduce the probability that the old bank nances the new bid, and increase the probability of piecemeal liquidation. The negative impact of the toehold on the old bank's decision to nance the winning bid di ers from the key nding of Str omberg (2000) that the probability of a saleback increases in his saleback bias variable. Our toehold e ect cannot bea saleback e ect because the creditor toehold pushes the bank to nance the winning bid also when the buyer is a new owner (i.e., when it is not a saleback) as well as when there are competing bids in the auction (i.e., when the saleback option is not risk-free). We interpret the toehold e ect in Tables 6 and 7 as re ecting either overbidding, bank information that low toehold bankrupt rms are relatively valuable acquisition targets, or both. The negative impact of the toehold is consistent with overbidding because the greater the old bank's toehold the greater the bank's incentive to nance relatively low valuation bidders (and push for overbidding), which in turn implies greater probability that the winning bid is actually nanced by the old bank. Furthermore, the insigni cance of the distress variable, which in Str omberg (2000) increases the probability of a saleback, indicates that the toehold fundamentally captures the impact of industry liquidity on the bank's re nancing decision.
4.4 Toehold/premium e ects and the re-sale hypothesis Table 8 and 9 show the estimated parameters in cross-sectional regressions with the auction premium as dependent v ariable. The auction premium c = ln(p=v a l , as de ned above. The purpose of these regressions is twofold. First, we examine to what extent toeholds a ect auction premiums as suggested by o u r o verbidding argument. That is, greater toeholds lead to more aggressive bidding, and thus greater auction premiums. Secondly, w e w ant to examine whether auction premiums are a ected by re-sales arguments. That is, to what extent does industry illiquidity, business cycle downturn and purchase of the assets by industry outsiders decrease auction premiums. The sample in bothtables exclude auction prepacks because the auction premium is not well de ned for prepacks (the trustee's liquidation value estimate incorporates knowledge of the nal prepack price) while Panel II of each table also excludes piecemeal liquidations. The only di erence between the two tables is that Table 9 excludes the variable interest (numberofinterested bidders reported by the auction trustee) and includes the variable outsider indicating that the winning bid is made by an industry outsider, as de ned in Str omberg (2000) . Tables 8 and 9 uses t 1 as the toehold, i.e., the old bank's toehold at the liquidation valuê v l . As shown, greater toeholds lead to signi cantly greater auction premiums. This key result, which is robust across all regression speci cations, is predicted by the overbidding theory. That is, the greater the toehold, the greater the incentive of the old bank to seek out a low valuation bidder and push for over bidding with the result of increasing the winning bid premium. However, overbidding is not the only possible explanation: greater toehold may bethe result of rms for which growth options (i.e., going concern value) constitute a greater proportion of total assets. Toeholds evaluated at the piecemeal liquidation value tend to behigh for these rms. Thus, the positive correlation between the toehold and the going concern value, represented by the auction premium. Note also that there is a signi cant e e c t of old bank nancing of the winning bid that is independent of the toehold. The variable bank n is consistently positive and signi cant, possibly indicating that the bank uses private information about the quality of the rm in its decision to nance the winning bid. There are additional interesting results in Tables 8 and 9 . First, neither the number of actual bid nor the numberofinterested bidders have a signi cant impact on the auction premium. While this nding is not predicted by theories of overbidding, it also does not contradict such theories. Second, the binary variable indicating saleback to the old owner is largely insigni cant. This result rejects the suggestions by Str omberg (2000) proposition that saleback transactions take place at lower premiums. Third, the industry distress variable, the bankruptcy 1991 dummy, and the outsider variable all have coe cients that are insigni cantly di erent from zero. This is inconsistent with asset re-sales arguments and suggests, if anything, the toehold induces old bank participation in the auction that counteracts a tendency for re-sales in otherwise illiquid auctions.
Conclusion
We show that an impaired debt claim is similar to an equity ownership position or a 'creditor toehold' in the distressed rm. When the rm goes bankrupt and is sold in an open, ascending auction with two bidders, the toehold induces the creditor to nance the lowest-valuation bidder and to push for overbidding. Examining mandatory bankruptcy auctions in Sweden, we nd strong toehold e ects: The greater the toehold the lower the probability that the old bank nances the winning bidder, and the higher the winning going-concern premium, both as predicted. Controlling for toehold e ects, there is no evidence that the going-concern premium is lower in business cycle downturns, in relatively distressed industries, or when sold to industry outsiders. Thus, there is no support for asset re-sale arguments, possibly becausebidding with creditor toehold helps counteract re-sale tendencies in relatively illiquid auctions.
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